St Andrews discharges its rector over Israel/Gaza

The University of St Andrews has announced that it has “discharged” its rector – removing her from the role of president (and chair) of the governing body, and as a trustee of the university as a charity.

She will still get to hold the ceremonial title of “rector” – but for the time being at least, the centuries-long tradition of students being able to choose who presides over meetings of the university’s governing body has been broken.

Maris had written to all students last November, calling Israel’s actions in Gaza a “genocide”, arguing that Palestinians faced “apartheid, siege, illegal occupation and collective punishment”, and calling for an immediate ceasefire.

An open letter was quickly submitted, arguing that Maris was “creating hatred” and asking her to apologise or resign. The university announced it was “utterly dismayed” and said it would investigate whether her message was “compatible” with her role.

With the press circling, a condemnatory campaign calling on Maris to be removed, and a counter-campaign defending her actions, then ensued – and following an investigation from a KC and a period of discussion between Maris and the Court, it has now resolved “with deep regret” that she has not did not provide “adequate assurance that there would not be a recurrence”.

The university’s statement curiously suggests that its decision “has no bearing” on Maris’ freedom of speech – but instead is based on the statutory requirements of the position as a charity trustee, and the governance requirements of the court’s code of conduct and the Scottish Code of Good HE Governance.

Of course in reality it is those requirements that, under Article (10)2 of the Human Rights Act, in theory represent a legitimate interference in her rights to express what some will regard as protected beliefs under the Equality Act 2010.

One of the key questions is therefore the formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties being used fit one of Article 10.2’s definitions – and whether what the university claims is a refusal to rule out similar conduct in the future is a legit reason for “discharge”.

Meet Stella Maris

Stella Maris was elected as rector at St Andrew’s in November 2023 for an initial three-year term. Only the second black woman to hold the role, she’s a former student of the university, having joined as an undergraduate student of English and Philosophy in 2017.

Since then, she’s been actively involved in student representation – serving as a Senior Student in St Salvator’s and Gannochy Hall, the Deputy Accommodations Officer for Halls, and the EDI rep for the School of English and the Department of Philosophy.

Notably, she spent three years serving as the “Rector’s Assessor” – a formal link role (that also gets to sit on Court) between Leyla Hussein (who herself was only the third woman and the first woman of colour to hold the position) and the student body.

Her manifesto for the election was fascinating – a passionate believer in change who had resolved not to shout from the sidelines, but to attempt to roll her sleeves up on the inside:

Serving on the University Court was revelatory. I observed a chasm, an almost mutual misreading: minoritized communities perceiving a lack of institutional care, and the university, at times, either oblivious to these sentiments or mistakenly believing that unvoiced concerns equate to non-existent ones. However, I have also witnessed the incredible progress that can be made when those barriers are lowered and both sides are able to meet and work together to achieve a shared goal.

Having taken upon the role last summer, on 21 November last year Maris sent an email to students entitled “Call for Immediate Ceasefire: Rector’s Statement on the Israeli – Palestine Conflict”. Subsequent to an opening “trigger warning”, Maris called “for an immediate ceasefire”, as well as recognition and condemnation of acts that “are internationally regarded as humanitarian and war crimes”.

There was a swift backlash – “alumni, students, and friends” of the university signed an open letter to express “deep concern”, calling the email an “abuse of position”, and judging the email as “not unifying, but divisive; not clarifying, but misleading; not hopeful, but damaging” and one that would “only bring division and hatred, whilst reinforcing a certain narrative that drives violent antisemitism across the world.”

By the following week Sally Mapstone, on behalf of the senior leadership team of the university, had issued a statement in response – making clear the rector’s role is an “independent representative” one, expressing “utterly dismay” that the rector had put her right to freedom of expression ahead of her duty to represent all students (and to be concerned for their welfare), and arguing that the language the email used, and some of the sources it cited, had “caused alarm, division, and harm” in the community, and more widely:

While some may have welcomed the message, others have been deeply offended and concerned by it… while she is accountable only to the student body whose interests she was elected to serve, we have, as individuals and as a group of senior leaders, asked her to reflect seriously on the evidence of the upset and fear she has caused, and to take such action as is necessary to restore confidence in her leadership amongst all students, and the wider community.

That wasn’t the end of things, though. Campaigns on both sides developed, and while Maris expressed regret for any distress or harm caused, she also stood by her views. By December 15, the court announced that it was to commission an independent external investigation to address questions raised about the “role and recent actions” of the rector. Crucially, it was to examine if the rector’s actions and activities were compatible with the responsibilities and standards placed on her as a member of court, and a trustee.

Morag Ross KC’s (who led the independent review of the University of Glasgow’s approach to addressing gender-based violence back in 2022) review has now been published, with a fairly extensive account of two key areas – the statement/email itself and the aftermath, and an evaluation of those responsibilities and their compatibility with Maris’ actions.

A balancing act

Ross’ summary of the legal position will be familiar to both university governance professionals and those working with or in students’ unions – it’s summarised in the executive summary, but broadly:

• The rector, although elected by students, has the same obligations as other members of the governing body and is bound by its Code of Conduct.
• As well as certain formal duties in relation to Court, the rector (largely by tradition) has pastoral responsibilities to students and is expected to be available to all students and to represent their interests. The rector should also be willing to “champion a cause”.
• Court members must adhere to the Ethical Standards in Public Life – act in the interests of the university, and not to act in a way likely to bring the university into disrepute. Court members also owe duties of respect.
• As charity trustees, members of court must act in the best interests of the charity and seek to ensure that the charity acts in a manner consistent with its purposes.
• A member of court in breach of obligations may be subject to dismissal.

If that sounds like it’s in tension with the university’s initial statement that the rector’s role is an “independent representative” one, that’s because it is. It’s an often delicate balancing act that SU officers – both trustees of their charity and often members of their university governing body – have to tread.

When it comes to freedom of speech and expression, Scotland is spared the shenanigans over the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023 – but given that the HEFoS Act is really a regulatory wrapper around the Human Rights Act, that still applies.

Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights gives freedom of speech a pretty high level of protection – but it’s not unqualified. Ross argues that the court is entitled to place some limits on the activities of its members in order to protect the interests and reputation of the university – provided they are proportionate.

In that balancing act, the court also has to be aware of the potential application of the Equality Act 2010 – particularly if anyone using their rights to speak shares a protected characteristic or is manifesting a protected belief.

Ross concludes that there is no “absolute” requirement that the rector – or any other court member – has to be impartial and non-partisan in the sense of political neutrality or not expressing controversial views. But there are limits:

If the content of expression by a court member runs contrary to the university’s best interests or is likely to damage its reputation, the court can restrict it.

As such, it can apply rules relating to conduct generally, which in St Andrews’ case are contained in a dedicated handbook. The only formal sanction for a breach is dismissal, but it is obviously possible that a member’s conduct or behaviour might fall below the required standard, but not to a degree justifying dismissal.

In general, Ross concludes that given the general starting point of a high level of protection for that freedom, the university should be “very slow” to conclude that there has been a breach other than in “very clear and obvious circumstances”.

If that all feels like some distance from the role that is often ascribed to the rector – a “willingness to champion a cause, without fear or favour” – that’s because it is.

It’s one of the reasons that in the 1950s an attempt was made by the then government to abolish the role. In 1963 the Robbins Report proposed repeal. In 1989 an attempt to abolish the right of the rector to chair the court was prompted by election at Glasgow University of Winnie Mandela – who was unable to attend court at all.

In 1992 an attempt to secure agreement that the rector should not chair the court, following advice to Edinburgh University by management consultants Coopers Lybrand, was rebuffed unanimously by the Scottish Rectors’ and Presidents’ Group before an amendment could be considered. There were also runs at abolishing the role – or at least its chair of court component – in 1997 and 2003.

Each time a call back to history and purpose has been heard – Scotland’s ancient universities were conceived as communities in which the students were the main interest group, and so the best way to ensure that their interests were always at the forefront of the minds of those actually running the university was to allow the students to elect the leader of the governing body.

It’s an important bit of tradition, in other words – the Higher Education Governance (Scotland) Act 2016 allocates much of what we might imagine a governing body chair does to the “senior lay member”. Over time, that’s allowed enough leeway in the structures to cope with outspoken rectors – but this time around, the court appears to have resolved that even those flexibilities were stretched too far. But were they?

“Poor judgement”

On the question of the statement itself, Ross found that while the term “genocide” is highly contested and criticised as inflammatory and unfounded, she tackles no view on whether it constitutes antisemitism. Instead, she argues that it could potentially encourage antisemitism, especially in a tense environment, and finds that Maris demonstrated “extremely poor judgement” by not considering that possibility.

One aspect of the evaluation was about consistency – Maris’ view was that the university should speak out against war and injustice, and saw an inconsistency between the university’s approach to Ukraine and the present conflict. Ross finds that while it’s “simplistic and superficial” to say that because the university made a statement in relation to Ukraine, it must do so in relation to Palestinians in Gaza, she also finds that if the university is prepared to make statements on some international conflicts, a similar flexibility to some degree should be given to the rector – albeit one expressed with “appropriate care”.

In the investigation, Maris also believed that it is necessary to support Palestinian students and students with pro-Palestinian views given the role in speaking up for students who feel worried and frustrated. Ross accepts that – but argues that particularly sensitive circumstances, “extra care” must be taken with language.

Wrap all of that up – including a disclaimer on the statement that it did not reflect the official view of the university and the principal taking steps to mitigate reputational damage, and Ross finds that that the statement was unwise and ill-judged, caused distress and contributed to division within the university, and that in those respects “was not in the interests of the university”.

But on the other side of the see-saw, Ross also finds that there are other relevant competing interests and, even to a limited extent, the statement furthered those interests. She also finds that some respect should be afforded to Maris’ own judgement – and so concludes that that the circumstances are “not sufficiently clear or obvious” to show that there is, overall, a breach of the relevant obligations:

In my view, there has been some reputational damage to the university, but it has been successfully mitigated. Respect for freedom of speech means that universities may have to withstand some criticism, and the rector has a role in speaking up for student interests. The idea of “censorship” also carries a risk of reputational damage. In my view, having regard to these factors, and on balance, there is no breach of this duty.

That’s effectively a description of the see-saw and a view on the angle of it for the court to consider – she then adds that if the court is satisfied that there is a breach, dismissal would be a “disproportionate response”:

The statement was a single issue. It contained a disclaimer. Division in the University was not entirely due to the Statement. Dismissal would interfere with Ms Maris’ rights to freedom of expression in an unjustified way. Again, any decision on sanction is a matter for the Court.

What happened next

On the aftermath, Ross reminds her readers that while the angle of the see-saw is a matter for court, it appears to her that, in this context, there was a “high priority” for avoiding causing distress and division – and takes the view that Maris did not act in the interests of the university.

Much of the period featured social media campaigning, in which Maris engaged in work to defend her position. This time Ross finds that the risk of reputational damage to the university does not arise in the same way, but that the social media activities were contrary to the best interests of the university – and that Maris was in breach of her obligations as a member of court and as a charity trustee, and in breach of her duty to act with courtesy and respect.

Reminding readers that it’s for the court to decide that there is a breach, Ross then suggests again that dismissal would be a disproportionate response:

The social media messages were very ill-judged, especially in view of the existing tensions. However, looking at the messages themselves, they are not, in my view, of the most serious kind. They were not sustained over a long period and I am not aware of any recent repetition. The messages did not include overtly abusive language and, to an extent, there was, in general terms, provocation from others. It is important for the Court not to seek to hold Ms Maris to an excessively high standard, relative to other Rectors.

Ross notably notes that dismissal would constitute a “very substantial interference” in respect of Maris’ freedom of expression. Ross also contemplates any application of the Equality Act in relation to anti-Zionism:

It is not clear to me what foundation, if any, there would be for establishing a belief for the purposes of section 10 of the 2010 Act. As a matter of generality, though, it is important that the university recognises the potential application of that legislation. In any event, actions taken by the university must be proportionate.

A period of dialogue

If you’ve got this far you may be thinking – well hold on, if the KC says that only one of the two episodes represented a breach, and in both cases Ross argued that dismissal would be a disproportionate response, why the news?

In essence what appears to have happened after the delivery of the report is a period of dialogue between Maris and the university – the latter seeking an assurance that Maris accepts Ross’ view on what constituted a breach, an acceptance of the responsibilities that Ross refers to, and a more fulsome apology than Maris had offered when expressing regret for harm caused, but not apologising for holding the view.

Hence a court resolution that dismisses from the roles of trustee and chair (president) because of:

• Refusal to clearly acknowledge and accept the findings of Lady Ross’s report, insofar as it relates to her behaviour, status and duties as a trustee;
• Failure to provide meaningful reassurance that the breaches identified by Lady Ross would not be repeated; and
• Subsequent behaviour and responses in the period since Lady Ross’s report was published, resulting in significant expenditure and the diversion of much Court effort from other issues to the detriment of the University as a whole.
• Continued refusal to acknowledge the breaches in her responsibilities identified by Lady Ross, including the breach of Ethical Standards in Public Life;
• Failure to accept Court’s asks in full and without qualification; her actions and activities since the submission of Lady Ross’s report.

In other words, while Ross finds breaches that would not warrant an interference in her rights to free speech via dismissal, the court finds that Maris’ “refusal” to fully accept that she was in breach, apologise for it and promise never to repeat does warrant dismissal.

The statement from the university argues that Maris “repeatedly declined to accept the conclusion” of the independent investigation – but Maris’ statement says that she has “repeatedly made clear” that she accepts that she is bound by a Code of Conduct and the requirements placed on her as a charity trustee:

I do not [however] accept that these allow the university to interfere unilaterally and unduly in my right to express my views or manifest my protected beliefs, and I fully intended to appeal the decision.

The university adds that it has pursued “extensive dialogue” with Maris to seek a resolution that would allow her to continue to sit as president and a member of court – asking her to acknowledge that aspects of her behaviour fell below the standards expected of a court member, to agree to be bound by the same obligations and commitments as other court members, and to apologise for the distress and fear experienced by some of the students she represents.

It says that she has “repeatedly declined to clearly acknowledge and accept Lady Ross’s finding that she breached her responsibilities” – but again, Maris’ position is that, in writing, she has confirmed that she acknowledges the judgements reached by Ross, understands her obligations and accepts that she is bound by collective responsibility and the code of conduct – in other words, she might not agree with Ross’ view on where to draw lines, but she has accepted the court’s view.

It sounds like that wasn’t enough for the court – and you end up with two positions. One, on the university’s part, which is effectively “we tried to get her to understand but as she refuses to agree, we assume she’ll repeat offend – so we’re discharging”. The other is “I accept the court’s view, but Ross said there’s a fine balance and I need to protect free speech. Oh, this does all feel like a stitch up”. The truth may well emerge in an appeal.

Wider issues

There’s a whole range of residual questions. Governing body codes of conduct are notoriously light on process detail – Maris claims that the meeting that resolved to “discharge” didn’t even allow her to present her case, which if nothing else feels like a departure from national justice principles.

It’s difficult to see how the rector can be the rector if they’re not a member of court. The position may or may not be sound legally – but again if nothing else, it renders the rector as someone who just stands outside the building campaigning against the university, quite a departure from the “community” purpose envisaged originally. It’s also quite a step for the university to say to students – sorry, you made the wrong choice – and we’re overruling you.

On the aftermath question, Maris’ language was fairly… defensive. But given this was pretty public, what this amounts to for me is suggesting that joining in some campaigning for her against the university was wrong. I’m not convinced any of us would respond better when under that kind of pressure – whatever the rights and wrongs of the original statement.

It’s also hard, when you take a step back, to see how dismissal can be a proportionate response when the actual acts weren’t – it’s dismissal for not being contrite enough. If there’s a recognition that the university can mitigate reputational damage – partly to enable an elected official to give voice to students in pursuit of free speech – the question is why they can’t continue to do that.

There’s also the question of the Students’ Association. In November its council passed a motion entitled “Motion for Advocating for Ceasefire in Israel-Gaza Conflict” in which members of the council acknowledged the conditions of the Palestinian people, the importance of ceasing military activity, the “significant influence and ethical responsibilities” of the university, and:

…moves us to reaffirm an unambiguous position of solidarity with Palestinians in line with the ICJ preliminary ruling that Israel, “in accordance with its obligations under the Genocide Convention, in relation to Palestinians in Gaza, take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of all acts within the scope of Article II of [the Genocide] Convention.

Most interpretations of charity law agree that an SU is entitled to hold a debate on a controversial, non “students as students” view and communicate that corporate conclusion to others – even if it’s prevented from spending resources on such a campaign. The SA supplies two members of the court.

Perhaps most troubling are the parts in Ross’ report about alumni and donors not being happy. In the Harvard and Pennsylvania cases last year, influential donors saying they would cut ties piled on the pressure:

Wall Street CEO Marc Rowan called for the leaders of the university to resign and donors to close their checkbooks. Billionare Ronald Lauder, a powerful financial backer of the university, threatened to cut off donations if the school doesn’t do more to fight antisemitism.

At Penn, ahead of a controversial multi-day event called the Palestine Writes Literature Festival which featured more than 100 Palestinian writers, filmmakers, and artists, leaders issued a statement ahead of the festival condemning antisemitism broadly, though not the festival specifically:

We unequivocally — and emphatically — condemn antisemitism as antithetical to our institutional values,” the university said before the event. “As a university, we also fiercely support the free exchange of ideas as central to our educational mission. This includes the expression of views that are controversial and even those that are incompatible with our institutional values.

But days later, UPenn President Liz Magill conceded that the response to the Palestine Writes Literature Festival was inadequate:

While we did communicate, we should have moved faster to share our position strongly and more broadly with the UPenn community.

She said she knew how “painful the presence of these speakers” on campus was for the Jewish community, especially during the holiest time of the Jewish year. “The University did not, and emphatically does not, endorse these speakers or their views,” Magill said.

Following an appearance at the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, she was gone by December.

Fine lines

Strip it all back, if everyone accepts that it was not Maris’ intention to foster antisemitism, you end up with yet another “fine line” to be drawn on free speech.

On the one hand, a university has laws to follow, a reputation to protect and students who have evidently experienced both personal dismay at the statement, and direct discrimination and harassment from others in the slipstream of the statement’s impact.

If its ceremonial figurehead is engaged in “causing” division and harm, and “refuses” to accept the impact on others and the university, is their position viable?

On the other hand, you have an elected student rep using her platform to engage in what the university’s own statements on freedom of speech would say “amount to views and opinions which others may find challenging or offensive”. In Maris’ view:

That those who do speak may, from time to time, express a view that some may find challenging or offensive does not mean that they should set out to cause harm, and should be conscious to do so in a way that reduces the potential for harm. I accept that fully.

I am therefore conscious that it is important to balance speaking out on controversial matters with the need to consider the views of all students and the wider interests of the university, the need to not deliberately cause any harm or distress, and the need to do so which will command the continued confidence of the student body – but that in doing so, that should not unduly restrict the ability of the Rector to speak freely, nor should it have a chilling effect on open and sometimes uncomfortable debate on campus.

If we follow the lines advocated by Arif Ahmed in England’s draft free speech guidance, we might also conclude that where folk express lawful views that are controversial – which may also be expressions of protected beliefs – that the university should take “reasonably practicable” steps to uphold the right to do so and protect those who may face attacks for doing so.

After all, not doing so may bring the university’s reputation over free speech into disrepute, could itself be subject to legal challenge, and could have a compromising and chilling effect on others in that St Andrews community who are attempting to engage in difficult or controversial debate. Leadership isn’t always about neutrality – and in the classroom, often not.

Maris can now appeal to the Chancellor, one Menzies Campbell. It’ll be interesting to see where he will draw the line.

_________

Stella Maris said:

I am disappointed by the University’s decision to remove me from University Court, which shows a lack of respect for the role of the Rector in speaking independently for students as their elected representative and sets a dangerous precedent for freedom of speech in higher education.

It is clear that I have been removed from University Court because I called for an end to Israel’s war crimes against Palestinians, and I will not apologize for doing so. As a young, neurodiverse Black woman with limited financial resources, I have faced the full force of the University, including a KC investigation, all because I made a statement supported by the overwhelming majority of students, calling for an end to a genocide.

Since my statement, the International Court of Justice has ruled that Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories and settlements violates international law and should end as soon as possible. The ICJ has further found a plausible case of genocide against Israel. The idea that Palestinian human rights and the war crimes of Israel in Gaza cannot be discussed in higher education is deeply concerning.

The University gave me no opportunity to present my case or to have someone represent me in the discussions that led to this decision. For reasons that only the Court will be able to explain, the University has chosen to go further than the report written by Morag Ross, which I believe is biased but which explicitly falls short of calling for the removal of my trustee status.

I have repeatedly made clear that I accept that I am bound by a Code of Conduct and the requirements placed on me as a charity trustee. I do not accept that these allow the university to interfere unilaterally and unduly in my right to express my views or manifest my protected beliefs, and I fully intended to appeal the decision. I will continue to advocate for students in my role as Rector to ensure that their voices are represented and that their right to freedom of speech is protected.”

Ray Perman, the Senior Lay Member and Chair of University Court said:

After extensive attempts at dialogue over three months, we have unfortunately now reached the point where University Court has concluded that she is in serious and persistent breach of her responsibilities and can no longer sit as President.

Under charity law and the Scottish Code of Good HE Governance, regrettably, Court has no choice but to discharge Stella Maris from two of the administrative roles that are traditionally associated with being Rector of a university.

Court wishes to stress that this decision has no bearing on Ms Maris’s freedom of speech, to which she is entitled and for which, like everyone else, she is personally accountable. We recognise that parts of the Rector’s statement were an important source of comfort to students affected by the conflict in Gaza.

We also wish to stress most explicitly that the Rector has never been asked to diminish or change her support of the Palestinian cause, only to acknowledge that in her handling of this matter, she caused distress and fear to some students, whom it was her duty to support and represent.

As the Chair of University Court, I wish to offer an apology to all students, and others, who were upset or feared for their safety as a consequence of the Rector’s handling of this matter, and those who were subsequently upset by the rise in tensions and disagreements which ensued.